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I Introduction
The rice economy of South Vietnam has been affected greatly by the continuing
war after the end of the Second World War. The war reduced rice production and mar-
keting in South Vietnam for several reasons. The first reason is danger and destruc-
tion by the war which make rice production impossible. Secondly, the farmers in a
dangerous area produce rice only as much as they consume. Thirdly, farmers are
withdrawn from rice production by their moving from their villages to cities as refugees
and by military draft. The fourth reason is the shortage of inputs for rice produc-
tion. The fifth reason is the decline in the efficiency of marketing of rice and of
production factors.
These effects of war show up clearly in the long-run data of rice production and
trade. Table 1 shows these data for Chochinchina and the Southern Region of South
Vietnam. The area under the Southern Region is almost the same as it under
Chochinchina. Until the beginning of the 40's, about 1.5 million tons of white rice
was exported each year because area planted to rice was more than 2 million
hectares and population was less than 5.5 million which is about a half of the
present population. But, because of the Second World War, of the Indo-China War
which lasted up to the mid 50's, and of the Vietnam War which continued through
the 60's and intensified in the latter half of the decade, the area planted to rice and
rice production stagnated from the mid 40's to the end of the 60's. None the less,
fair amounts of white rice had been exported until 1963 almost every year. The
stagnation of rice area and rice production continued and population continued to
grow, and finally from 1965 it became necessary for South Vietnam to import
considerable amounts of white rice every year. In the Mekong Delta, i. e., Western
Part of Southern Region, in 1974 it is believed that a considerable amount of paddy
field was abandoned because of the war. I ) In Central Region the area planted to
* This paper is a revised and improved version of my paper in Japanese which appeared in South East
Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No.1, June 1975, pp. 19-44. The research resulted in this paper was partially
supported by the Matsunaga Research Grant from Matsunaga Science Foundation.
** tt* t~, Department of Agricultural Economics, Faculty of Agriculture, Kyoto University
1) Based on the author's interview of private and official people who are in close contact with rice
production and rice marketing in South Vietnam in August 1974.
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Table I Rice Production and Rice Trade for Cochinchina and Southern Region
A B C D E F
Rice Area* Paddy Paddy Rice Export Rice Import PopulationCultivated Production Production-SVN -SVN

















51 1288 272 5737
52 1349 152 5702
53 1541 102 6004
54 1572D 177.b 0 5601
1955 1821 2318 3229 82 0.3 7089
56 2060 2741 3412 5 28 7642
57 2125 2542 8192 193 18 8372
58 1702 3477 4235 117 2 8152
59 1810 4113 5092 249 4 8908
1960 1749 4148 4955 346 14 9111
61 1823 3750 4607 156D 2
62 1925 4296 5205 86 42 9335
63 1965 4364 5327 338 0 9156
64 1954 4205 5185 49 0 9405
1965 1877 3972 4822 n 130D 9785
66 1819 3539 4336 0 434 9857
67 1832 3904 4688 0 765 10414
68 1929 3662 4366 0 678 10283
69 1966 4307 5115 n 326 10494
1970 2045 4812 5716 0 559 11211
71 2154 5269 6324 n 137 12193
72 2288 5331 6348 n 276 12670
73 7025~r D 304Dn
74 7200pr 0** 291*
1975 200u
1. Rice area cultivated and paddy production for tjt+ 1 crop year can be found in the t-th year
row.
2. -: The data are not available, D: Certain discontinuity in time series, SVN: South Vietnam,
pr: FAO's estimate, n: Negligible value, **: January and February only, *: January to June
only, U: UN estimates for Vietnam.
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3. Sources of each data
A. (1) 1937, Robequain (32, p. 220).
(2) 1938-53, Sansom (34, pp. 262-63)
(3) 1954-1972, Rep. of Vietnam, M. of Agr., AESS, Agricultural Statistics Year Book. Data
from 1954 to 1957 were estimated by Directorate of Agriculture. From 1958 henceforth
they are results of surveys carried out by the AESS.
(4) Up to 1953 the data for Chochinchina and after 1953 the data for South Vietnam were
adopted.
(5) USAID stated that area in cultivation was over stated for 1956-58.
B. (1) A-(3), (4).
C. (1) A-(3).
D. (1) 1935-1953, Sansom (34, pp. 262-fi3).
(2) 1954-1960, National Institute of Statistics.
(3) 1961-1974, Directorate General of Customs,.
(4) In and after 1954 rice by-products are also included.
E. (1) 1954-1964, Directorate General of Customs.
(2) 1965-1972, USAID/Vietnam.
(3) 1973, Directorate General of Customs.
(4) Jan. -June, 1974, FAa, Rice Trade Intelligence, Feb. 10, 1975, p. 24.
F. (1) 1936-1955, Sansom (34, p. 263).
(2) 1956-1972, National Institute of Statistics, (27, p. 357).
4. In 1961 there was a flood. In 1968 there was a drought. In 1968 there was a Tet offensive. Rice
export was banned in 1956 and in 1965. In 1972 there was a spring offensive.
rIce decreased by 140 thousand hectares from 1964/65 to 1972/73.2)
As described just above, the rice economy of South Vietnam was depressed
greatly by the continuing war. But from around the end of the 60's this rice economy
experienced new technological, institutional, and economic changes. These changes
are (I) development of land reform launched by the 1970 Land-to-the-Tiller-Law,
(2) the fast dissemination of the IR varieties, (3) expansion of double and triple rice
cropping in the Delta, (4) the establishment of National Food Administration (NFA),
and (5) the fast inflation of most goods including rice and petroleum.
The followings are the several recent researches on the rice economy of South
Vietnam: A research report of rice marketing and storage by Wildman Agr. Res.,
Inc.B) ; A series of econometric research reports by Economic Research Service of
USDA.4) But according to the author's knowledge, there was no empirical and com-
prehensive study of rice economy and rice policy in recent years. This paper IS a
2) Directorate of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Statistics Yearbook, 1972, p. 34.
3) Wildman Agr. Res., Inc., Economic and Engineering Study, Grain Storage and Marketing System, USAID,
Toledo, Ohio, March 1970.
4) USDA, ERS, Economic Considerations in the Development of Agriculture in Vietnam, ERS, USDA; Viet-
nam MLRAFD; USAID, Feb. 1974: R. F. Daly, et al., Vietnamese Agricultural Situation and Near-
Term Prospects, ERS, USDA; Vietnam MLRAFD; USAID, Jan. 1973: R. F. Daly, et al., Agri-
culture in the Vietnam Economy, A System for Economic Anarysis, ERS, USDA; Vietnam MLRAFD;
USAID, June 1973: A. D. Jones and F. E. Niernberger, Grain Marketing in South Vietnam, ERS,
USDA; Vietnam MLRAFD; USAID, Nov. 1972: C. A. Moore, Transportation and Vietnam's
Agriculture, ERS, USDA; Vietnam MALRAFD; USAID, Oct. 1973: Bill Bulton. et al., Produc-
tion Capacity and Suppry Responce in Vietnam's Agriculture: An Application of an Economic Research Service
Production-Distribution Model for Vietnam. ERS, USDA, May 1974.
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result of this kind of study.
The objectives of this paper are as follows:
1) To describe rice production, consumption, trade, nce price determination,
and the relevant policies with an emphasis on rice marketing for the period from the
60's through the early 70's until August 1974, and to clarify the related problems.
To describe also the new changes from around the end of the 60's which were men-
tioned just above.
2) To investigate the collection method of and reliability of the statistics con-
cerning the rice economy during the 60's and the 70's until 1974.
3) To present some proposals regarding the future rice policy and the future
agricultural development of Vietnam based on the results from 1) and 2).
The major materials used for this study are the statistics of South Vietnam Govern-
ment, other published materials, and the results of the author's interviews and observa-
tions in the Delta and Saigon in 1974 in addition to the recent research publications
mentioned just above. The author's investigation in South Vietnam, althought it
was very short in terms of duration,S) was very useful for evaluating and analyzing
statistics and documents, and gave very good information about the actual conditions
of the rice economy in 1974. The author's investigation had emphases on (1) rice
market and rice marketing and the policies related to these aspects, and (2) the methods
for collecting government statistics and reliability of the statistics. The author's past
researches on the rice economy and rice policy of Thailand provided a good com-
parative viewpoint for the study presented in this paper.
II The Rice Econo:my of South Vietna:m
The agriculture, forestry, and fishery sector of South Vietnam had relatively larger
share than the same sector in the neighbouring countries. The average share of this
sector in GDP of South Vietnam from 1966 to 1970 was about 34%? This share
actually meant much more because the government sector occupied up to 23% of
GDP due to the war situation.7) In the total value of production of the agriculture,
forestry, and fishery sector, paddy occupied about 30-45% during the 60's and thus
paddy was the most important agricultural product in South Vietnam.S) Rice is
5) About two weeks from the end of July to the middle of August, 1974.
6) National Bank of Vietnam, Economic and Financial Indicators, National Income and Statistics Depart-
ment, 1st Quarter, 1974., Table 5.4.
7) For example, the shares of the agriculture, forestry, and fishery sector and the government sector
of Thailand in GDP for the same period were 30% and 5% respectively. Bank of Thailand,
Monthly Bulletin, August 1974, p. 105.
8) This share is about at the same level as it for Thailand according to Royal Thai Government, Min.
of Agr. and Coop., Agricultural Statistics of Thailand, Crop Year 1972/73, No. 25, 1974, p. 91.
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the staple food for South Vietnamese, and it was one of the two most important foreign
exchange earners together with rubber in the past.
2. 1 Production
The paddy production in South Vietnam during the 50's and the 60's changed
slightly depending on the situation of the war, but as a trend it stagnated as Table 1
and 2 indicate. Especially during the latter half of the 60's paddy production and
the area planted to paddy decreased greatly because of the escalation of the Vietnam
War. But from the end of the 60's the production and area increased rapidly, and
the paddy yield per hectare also increased rapidly as shown in Table 1 and 2.
These new trends around 1970 can be considered to be made possible by (1) the
decrease in intensity of the war after the Tet Offensive in early 1968, (2) fast spread
of the high yielding varieties (HYV) and extension of the double and triple paddy
cropping supported by this spread, and (3) fast execution of land reform from 1970.
Introduction of HYV began with IR8 in 1967 and IR5 in 1968 (designated as TN8
and TN5 in South Vietnam) developed by IRRI, and followed by IR20 in 1969 and
IR22 in 1970. In 1971 RD1, a locally developed HYV in Thailand, was imported
from Thailand.g) From around 1971 IR8 and IR5 which had low quality in various
aspects were rarely planted, and IR20, Improved IR20, IR22, IR26, IR73/1, IR73/2
which had better quality substituted for IR8 and IR5. tO) The area planted to HYV
increased very rapidly from 500 hectares in 1968/69 to 840,000 hectares in 1972/73,
and it was said to reach 500,000 hectares in the Delta only in 1974.11) The average
yield of HYV was very high, and reached 3.7-4.0 ton/ha. (paddy) while that of the
traditional varieties was 1.7-1.8 ton/ha. (paddy). This yield difference was probably
caused by the considerably high fertilizer input to HYV in South Vietnam. Lee
estimated this input level as 122 kg/ha. in terms of the 3 plant nutrients in 1970/71.12)
Regarding multiple cropping of paddy, it was estimated that about 400,000 hectares
of double cropping and about 30,000 hectares of triple cropping were done in 1973/
74.13) The paddy area under multiple cropping increased very rapidly and mainly
in the Delta.14) This fast increase was facilitated by the high-yielding capacity, non-
photosensitivity, and short maturity of the HYV of paddy.
9) D. G. Dalrymple, Imports and Plantings of High-Yielding Varieties of Wheat and Rice in the Less Developed
Nations, For. Econ. Dev. Service, USDA; USAID, Feb., 1972, p.44.
10) Based on the author's interview of government officials, rice merchants, and farmers, and on the
information provided from Professor K. Kyuma of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies of Kyoto
University who made a survey trip in the Delta from December 1974 to January 1975.
11) Based on the information from Professor K. Kyuma.
12) Dong-Bai Lee, Economic Survey of Fertilizer Situation in the Asian and Pacific Region, ASPAC Food and
Fertilizer Technology Center, Dec. 1973, pp. 169-173, 182-185. In Thailand fertilizer input
in terms of the 3 plant nutrients in paddy production in general was only 13 kg/ha.
13) Based on the author's interview at Directorate of Agricultural Economics, Min. of Land Reform
and Agriculture and Fishery Development.
14) Refer to Daly, et al., Agriculture in the Vietnam Economy, p. 150.
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N Table 2 The Rice Economy of South Vietnam<n()O
H* 1* J* K L M N 0 P Q R
C 1 . Area Average f Rice Arrival Saigon Saigon Whole- CPI Nitrogenous Paddy Paddy/Fert.
u tIvated d yo ld Import 0 at Saigon Retail Price sale Price Q'X0rking) Fertilizer at Rice Mills Price Ratio.A un er Ie F T
rea HYV C/H ertllzer (Paddy Equiv.) (Soc Nau) (NO.1 Rice) Class Price (Delta) (Q/P)
Units 1,000ha. 1,000ha. ton/ha. 1,000ton 1,000ton $VN/kg $VN/100kg 1963= 100 $ VN/ton $ VN/ton
Sources AESS AESS AESS D. G. Cust. D. Int. Trade NIS NIS NIS Lee (20), IDC, ERS Lee (20), NISNIS USDA, et at. Daly (4), DAE
1955 2244 0 1.26 - - - 455 80.3
56 2540 0 1.34 79 - - 457 89.8
57 2719 0 1.17 55 630 - 435 85.7
58 2291 0 1.85 81 661 - 484 84.0
59 2400 0 2.12 159 892 5.2 385 86.1
1960 2318 0 2.14 131 887 5.0 397 85.0 - 2650 ~61 2353 0 1.96 124 848 6.8 519 90.4 - 3490 - am-62 2479 0 2.10 116 877 6.5 520 93.2 - 3390 - '-J
63 2538 0 2.10 323 1116 6.5 529 100.0 - 3370 - \('.
64 2557 0 2.03 261 774 7.7 550 102.9 - 3630 - '-J~1965 2429 0 1.99 251 684 8.8 654 119.7 - 3730 - ~
66 2295 0 1.89 267 488 13.4 1050 194.4 6300 6870 1.1
67 2296 0 2.04 205 448 27.2 2030 279.0 8700 13330 1.5
-68 2394 0.5u 1.82 70 445 28.2 2073 354.2 8955 12130 1.4 Ut[i)lt:
69 2430 40u 2.10 485 494 39.5 3135 431.6 9100 20510 2.3 eN
1970 2511 502u 2.28 518sf 627 53.2 4023 590.0 10210 24670 2.4 ~
71 2625 674 2.41 179nf 656 58.5 4799 698.1 12000 29380 2.4
72 2700 835 2.35 315 760et 90.1 7229 874.5 27717 46170 1.7
73 2800e - 2.51 e 326 73get 11.20t 11174 1263.3 - - 1.0ee
74 - - - 110** 215!t* - 14738tt 1840.0,ttt - - 0.5ee
1975
1. In the columns with *, the area or yield data for tit+1 crop year are located in the t-th year row.
2. -: Data are not available, e: DAE's estimate, u: Darlymple (7, p. 44), sf: In 1970 about 280 thousand tons of fertilizer was used and 365 thousand
tons was reserved, Lee (20, p. 182), nf: A large amount of fertilizer was stocked in 1971, Lee (20, p. 181), **: Jan. & Feb. only, et: Tsujii's
estimate, t: June, tt: February, ttt: March, ee: USAID's estimate.
3. Soc Nau appears under column M was the low quality rice for low income people, and No.1 Rice under column N was the first class whole
grain rice.
4. For the price of nitrogenous fertilizer, 46% urea price from Lee (20, p. 185) and the retail price of urea from NIS were used for 1966-'71 and
and 1972 respectively.
5. Paddy price at rice mill was obtained from Daly et at. (5, p. 187) for 1960-'71 and from DAE for 1972.
6. Paddy/fertilizer price ratios for 1973-'74 were obtained from USAID (44).
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The land reform under the Land-to-the-Tiller-Law redistributed about one million
hectares of land to farmers from 1970 to the end of 1972.15) The importance of the
effect of this land reform on the South Vietnamese rice economy is clear considering
the fact that the total area planted to paddy in South Vietnam in 1972/73 was about
2.7 million hectares.
Next we investigate the regional distribution of paddy production. This distribu-
tion is biased strongly to Southern Region. About 80-85% of the countries' paddy
production comes from this area. Especially Western Part of Southern Region, i. e.,
the Delta is the surplus producing area and the rice bowl of South Vietnam. There,
about 70-75% of the total paddy production in South Vietnam is produced. This
share did not change much since 20 years ago. It was the Delta that supported large
amounts of rice export from Chochinchina in the past. 1ti)
In the foregoings the paddy production in South Vietnam was described using
the former government's statistics. Now we investigate the reliability of the statistics.
In this section the statistics relating to paddy production, yield and the area planted
to paddy were mainly used. These statistics based themselves on Area Survey and
Crop Cutting Survey (CCS) which had been executed every year by Agricultural
Economics and Statistics Service (AESS) in Directorate of Agricultural Economics
(DAE) starting from 1958/59.17) These surveys covered 13 crops including paddy.
In the following we will discuss major contents of these surveys and reliability of the
statistics obtained from these surveys.
These two surveys were done to 1,000 villages and 20 farmers for each of the vil-
lages selected by the two stage random sampling method. In Area Survey area planted
to each crop by the 20 sample farmers for each sample village was surveyed in October
of each year. The area collected in this way, then, was weighted by the total number
of farmers to give the provincial average area planted to each crop under survey on
farmer basis. Regarding crop yield, crop cutting of one sample plot selected at random
in each sample village was done under CCS. The result obtained from this crop cut-
ting was then weighted by planted area obtained in Area Survey to give the provincial
average yield for each crop. The total area planted to each crop was obtained by
multiplying the provincial average area planted to each crop for a single farmer
estimated from Area Survey and the total number of farmers in that province and
summing the products up over all provinces in South Vietnam. The total produc-
tion of each crop was estimated by multiplying the provincial total area planted and
the provincial average yield obtained from CCS and summing the product up over
al~ provinces in South Vietnam.
15) Directorate of Agr. Econ., Min. of Agr., Agricultural Statistics Yearbook 1972, Dec. 1973, p. 176.
16) Charles Robequain, The Economic Development of French Indo-China, tr. by Isabel A. Ward, Oxford
Univ. Press, 1944, pp. 308-309.
17) In and before 1957-58, there exist estimates of Directorate of Agriculture.
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The foregoing is the formal description of the method by which planted area and
production data for 13 crops were collected by the government. This method was,
however, affected by the conditions of the war and error in the survey process. War
situation put strong limitations on sampling villages and crop cutting plots. According
to Sansom the rural area of South Vietnam was once devided into 5 regions: (1)
government village, (2) semisecure government village, (3) contested village, (4) semise-
cure Viet Cong village, (5) Viet Cong village, depending on the balance of military
control. The first two areas were under good government control. Third area often
went under National Liberation Front's (NLF) control during the night. The last
two area were under NLF's control and trade between these areas and other areas
were restricted. The fourth area were often attacked by the government forces. From
1966 to 1967 about a half of the land and population of the Delta belonged to the third
area, and about 150/0 of the land and 250/0 of the population belonged to the second
area. The government officials could not move in the third area without military
protection even at daytime. IS) Consequently area under the last three regions of
the Sansom's demarcation must have occupied a large part of the Delta. This situa-
tion must have affected the sampling process for the crop production and the planted
area data. First, according to the section chief of AESS who was in charge of the
sampling, about 30% of the orignal sample villages was infact selected in the
NLF controled area. Then these villages were replaced with other villages where
survey could be conducted.19) Second, the total number of farmers in each province
used in estimating the total paddy production as described just above, was probably
calculated for the area under the government control (probably including the contested
villages).20) From these two points we can say that the government's paddy produc-
tion statistics before 1974 did not include paddy production in the area under the
strong NLF controJ.2 l ) Consequently this production statistics tended to be smaller
than the "true production level" of South Vietnam. Area under government control
changed over time. Because of this change we can say that the government's paddy
production statistics had a tendency to fluctuate over time.
Next we investigate the bias in the survey process. The largest bias was probably
the underreport of planted area by the farmers. Yield was estimated by the crop
cutting method, but planted area was obtained by interview. 22) Farmers have a
18) R. L. Sansom, The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, Cambridge, Mass: M. I. T.
Press, 1970, pp. 8-9.
19) Based on the author's interview with the government officials in AESS and Can Tho provincial
government who were in charge of agricultural statistics.
20) Daly, et al., Agriculture in the Vietnam Economy, pp. 148-179.
21) A statistics officer of the Can Tho office of Ministry of Agriculture said to the author that he con-
sidered the area under Viet Cong control was waste land, and paddy production there belonged to
Viet Cong, and that not much paddy production was done there because of the danger from the
war.
22) Based on the author's interview at AESS.
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general tendency to underreport their planted area to the government who is their
tax collector. Tenancy was prevalent in the Delta until around 1970, and the rent
was a considerable share of paddy production. During the 60's the security in rural
area deteriorated greatly, and the local government officers' collecting land rent on
behalf of absentee landlords on 30% commission became very prevalent.23) The
author thinks that the general underreporting tendency of the farmers and the local
government officers' collecting rent mentioned just above were major reasons of the
underreport of planted area. The section chief of AESS in charge of agricultural
production statistics admitted the existence of the underreport, and estimated its degree
as 10-20%. But this underreport of planted area was not adjusted in estimating
the total planted area. 24) The land reform started in 1970 was reported to have
progressed considerably, and thus the effect of the second reason on the underreport
mentioned just above probably decreased considerably after 1970.
We can conclude from the above investigation of the reliability of the former
government's paddy production statistics as follows. The formal method and frame-
work of collection of the statistics were good, but in effect planted area statistics during
the 60's were probably underestimated by 10-20%, and consequently production
statistics by similar degree. The paddy production statistics did not cover the area
under the solid NLF control where statistical survey was not possible, and thus did
not represent the total paddy production of the whole South Vietnam's region. It
is very probable that the underestimation of paddy production during the 60's men-
tioned just above became smaller in 1974 because of the fast progress of land reform
starting in 1970 in South Vietnam. If this holds, the fast increase of paddy produc-
tion from around 1970 to 1974 discussed in the beginning of this section must be viewed
with some reservation.
2. 2 Consumption
As described in the preceding section paddy production in South Vietnam was
regionally greatly biased. Rice consumption was also regionally biased in the same
way as paddy production. This conformity between production and consumption
biases was probably due to the following reasons: (1) Paddy growing farmers tend
to eat more rice than other farmers and families in other occupations because the paddy
farmers eat what they produce. (2) Rice price is cheaper in the surplus paddy pro-
ducing area than in the shortage area. The regional per capita annual rice consump-
tion in 1972 estimated by the author using mainly the government statistics is 329 kg,
132 kg, 151 kg, and 214 kg for the Delta, Eastern Part (including Saigon), Central
Region, and whole South Vietnam respectively. The bias among the estimated re-
gional rice consumption levels and the level of the national rice consumption seem
23) Sansom, op. cit., pp. 66-67.
24)!lBased on the authors interview.
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to be too large in comparison with those of, for instance, Thailand.25 ) Details about
this point will be discussed in Section 2.5 when rice balance will be investigated.
In South Vietnam there were no independently measured time series data of
flce consumption until 1974.26 ) Therefore the author's estimates of rice consumption
above were obtained through the demand supply balance approach. USDA esti-
mated annual rice use by the same approach from 1961 to 1970 and further estimated
the income and price elasticities of rice consumption for South Vietnam. The
estimated income and price elasticities are for the whole country 0.25'"'-'0.35 and -0.2
'"'-'-0.3 respectively, and for the rural area -0.1'"'-'-0.5 and -0.5'"'-'-0.7 respec-
tively.27> It is interesting to note that the income elasticity in the rural area has
nagative value. These elasticities play important roles in policy analyses and demand
supply projections.
2. 3 Foreign Trade
As described above South Vietnam became a net importer of rice in 1965, and
then from 1966 became one of the large rice importing countries in the world until
1974.28) Except a small amount of Thai rice, most of the imported rice was American
rice and was imported under PL 480. The imported rice under PL 480 mostly
consisted of the Tytle I rice under concessional sales agreements and only partly of
the Tytle II rice, i. e., donation in emergency. Very large trade deficit and low level
of foreign currency reserve of South Vietnam deteriorated futher and rapidly from
around 1965, and the import of large amounts of rice every year by South Vietnam
could be done only on concessional basis. In 1971 the ratio between values of total
export and import was 1 to 70.5. The reserve of foreign currency in 1973 was about
12.5 million U. S. dollars, while rice import under Tytle I only reached 8.5 million
U. S. dollars in the same year.
As described just above all the rice import of South Vietnam toward the end of
the 60's and early 70's was conducted virtually under the food aid program of the
United States. Thus rice import was decided on the G-G basis between the South
Vietnam Government and the United States. But the short run decision of rice im-
port seemed to be affected by the demand and supply situation of rice in Saigon. An
econometric analysis by USDA mentioned above showed that the delivery of rice from
the Delta to Saigon was a very important factor to determine the amount of rice
imported.29)
25) The survey by NIS of 7 cities and 5,427 families in South Vietnam in 1962 gave annual per capita
rice consumption as 156 kg. The 1963's nationwide survey gave annual per capita rice consump-
tion of Thailand as about 170 kg, and for some of the rice growing rural area it was reported that
per capita rice consumption reached more than 200 kg per year.
26) This is true in the neighboring countries, e. g., Thailand.
27) Daly, et al., Agriculture in the Vietnam Econom.v, p. 12.
28) See Table 1 and refer to various issues of FAO Rice Trade Intelligence.
29) Daly, et al., Agriculture in the Vietnam Economy, p. 45.
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The rice import in 1971 was rather low. But from 1972 to 1974 its quantity
tended to increase. The fact that a large amount (about 300,000 ton) of rice was
imported during the first 6 months of 1974 seemed to be related with the intensifica-
tion of the war in 1974.
Before 1968 all of the PL 480 rice was imported through Saigon. But because
of the congestion of the Saigon Port, part of the PL 480 rice began to be imported from
some ports in Central Region from 1968.
The reliability of rice trade statistics in relatively higher in comparison with
production and consumption statistics because of the way these statistics were col-
lected. This point holds true for most of the rice trading countries in the world.
2. 4 Rice Price and Fertilizer Price
Rice and paddy prices in South Vietnam were surveyed by National Institute
of Statistics (NIS) and Agricultural Marketing Research Service (AMRS) of DAE
in 1974. NIS had been collecting monthly wholesale and retail prices in Saigon from
long time ago. AMRS was surveying paddy prices at the farm level, paddy and rice
prices at the rice mill level, and retail price of rice for all over the country. The
AMRS's survey was done by about 100 agricultural statistical officers and representa-
tives, and these local statistics people reported monthly and sometimes weekly to AMRS.
In special cases AMRS conducted survey by itself sometimes using questionair. In
the present section we investigate the AMRS's price data.
The paddy price at the farm level began to be collected from the 70's, and this
price was not yet listed in the annual and monthly statistical report of DAE. Accord-
ing to AMRS this price was surveyed from the randomly selected 200 pilot farms in
South Vietnam in 1973. But actual number of farms surveyed was only about 20..........
25% of the whole pilot farms. An officer in charge of this price survey thought that
the sample size was big enough to measure the paddy price at the farm level. The
author thought that the sample size should be bigger than what it was in 1973. The
number of the pilot farms was planned to be increased up to 300 in 1974.
The paddy and rice prices at the rice mill level, i. e., the wholesale prices were
surveyed for two grades of white rice (Rice No.1 and Long Rice) and three grades
of paddy (Long Grain, Ordinary, High Grade). This survey was conducted twice
a month for 25 sampled rice mills for each province. The rice mills surveyed were
planned to be sampled at random. But, in effect, if some rice mills were too "far
away" to be surveyed their substitutes were surveyed.
The retail price of rice was originally surveyed for a single grade (Rice No.1,
25 % brokens). This price was collected from 3 retail shops in each of at least 3 market
places in each province in South Vietnam. From September 1973 number of grades
under this survey increased to 5, i. e., Long Grain, Ordinary Grain, Rice No.1, TN
20 and TN 22, Broken No.1 and No.2. The results of this survey were published
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together with the retail prices of other 40 commodities in the monthly statistical report
of DAE. The dayly retail rice price in Saigon was also collected from 5,.......10 retail
shops in each of 6 market places for the following 4 grades: Red Rice, Rice No. I (250/0
brokens), Good Rice (White), Special Rice (Long Grain). Furthermore, by the
request of the Minister of Agriculture, the retail rice price of these four grades in the
major provinces of the Delta was surveyed by 2,.......3 days interval using telephone.
As described above, in addition to the long time series of the wholesale and retail rice
prices in Saigon collected by NIS, DAE initiated the survey of the producers', wholesale
and retail prices of rice and other agricultural products for whole South Vietnam in the
early 70's. There were some problems in relation to the methods of collecting the
DAE's price data as mentioned just above, but it was desirable that this kind of price
data be accumulated for long time period.
Now based on the DAE's price data we investigate the regional and inter-variety
price differences of rice. The facts were as follows: The wholesale price of paddy
was lower in the Delta and Saigon in Eastern Part, and higher in Eastern Part except
Saigon and Central Region. The annual average wholesale price of Ordinary Pad-
dyB°) per 100 kg was 4,617, 4,614, 5,613, 4,866 piastol for the Delta, Saigon, Eastern
Part, Central Lowland respectively. For Central Highland there was the price data
only for Pleiku and it was 6,444 piastol. In Eastern Part, the price difference between
Saigon and the other area was much larger in 1972 than in 1971. These facts can
be explained schematically as follows: South Vietnam was a net rice importing
country from 1965, and thus its spatial price structure became a reversed cone with
its peak at Saigon where was a rice importing place. In other words, rice price at
Saigon was cheapest, and it became higher as we move farther from Saigon. When
the war was intensified rice transport from Saigon toward the base of the cone where
marginal provinces were located became difficult. Then rice price at the marginal
provinces rose and the reversed cone shaped price structure was elongated. Nineteen
seventy-two was the year of Spring Offensive. The much larger price difference be-
tween Saigon and the other area in Eastern Part in 1972 mentioned above could pro-
bably be caused by the elongation of the price cone discussed just above. The fol-
lowing two points support this schematic explanation: (1) Paddy price in Phuoc
Long province where was on the Cambodian border and was the farthest province
from Saigon in Eastern Part was 6,735 piastol per 100 kg in 1972 and the highest in
South Vietnam. (2) In the transport cost of rice and other goods from Saigon not
only economic costs but also security costs were included.3!)
The actual spatial price structure of South Vietnam was in fact more complex
than what was described above. From 1968 to 1974 this price structure must have
30) Paddy grades were from better to ordinary, Long Grain Paddy, High Grade Paddy, and Ordinary
Pady
31) Wildman Agr. Res., Inc., Economic and Engineering Study, Grain Storage and l\;Iarketing System, USAID,
Toledo, Ohio, March 1970, p. 76.
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been the complex of some reverse cones with their peaks at Saigon, in the Delta, and
several port cities in Central Region. This complex was also bended depending on
the geographical, economic, and military conditions at certain point in time. The
peaks in the Delta in 1972 were at Chau Doc, Vinh Binh, and Ba Xuyen according
to the price statistics.
Next we discuss about inter-variety price difference of rice. It was well known
that IR8 and IR5 which were early HYV were sold in most of the Southeast Asian
countries at the price 10-20% less than TV because taste of IR8 and IR5 was not
liked by the Southeast Asian people. In South Vietnam, for instance, the wholesale
price of IR8 was lower than the prices of the traditional high quality rice (Nang
Huong) and the traditional ordinary rice (Soc Nau) by 43% and 13% respectively
in Saigon on the average for the period from May 1970 to April 1971. IR20 and
and IR22 were the varieties which were improved especially about the disadvan-
tage of the early HYV's mentioned just above. Thus price difference between these
varieties and TV should be smaller than the price difference between the early HYVs
and TVs. According to the DAE's wholesale price data in the Delta in February
1974, the price of IR20 and IR22 was lower than the price of (1) the high quality Long
Grain Rice and (2) the medium quality Ordinary Rice and Rice No.1 (25%) by
18'"'-'25% and 5'"'-'13% respectively.82) This smaller price difference for IR20 and IR
22 was an important reason why these varieties completely substituted for IR8 and
IR5 in the early 70's in South Vietnam. But the price difference implies that TVs
were still preferred by the South Vietnamese to IR20 and IR22.
Finally we discuss about the relative price between rice and fertilizer. As shown
in Table 2, the wholesale price of No. 1 Rice rose from 1966 to February 1974 by a
little less than 1,400%. The price rise after 1972 was very fast, and this was caused
by the world as well as the domestic inflation. One of the most important factors
for the HYV to spread very rapidly from the beginning of the 70's and to produce
high yield was that the farmers who planted HYV could buy fertilizer at low price
in comparison with paddy price. In Table 2 the relative price between paddy and
nitrogenons fertilizer is given. This relative price tended to rise from 1966 to 1969
because the government controlled the domestic fertilizer price33) by the multiple
exchange rates policy and the American aid for the fertilizer import of South Vietnam.
But this trend disappeared in 1971, and from 1972 this relative price decreased rapidly.
This means that the domestic fertilizer price increased far more rapidly than the fast
rise of the domestic wholesale price of rice after 1972. This was a bad situation for
the HYVs to produce high yield.
2. 5 Market and Marketing
32) In Central Region there often were reverse price differences. This might be a reflection of the
regional difference in the people's taste.
33) Lee, op. cit., pp. 179-87; USAID, Economic Background Data, Saigon, July 1974, p. 4.
275
Until 1974 rice marketing in South Vietnam was done mostly by the Overseas
Chinese. The government executed considerable adjustment of demand and supply,
and of price in the rice market through National Food Administration (NFA). A
new change in the rice market in the 70's was that several rice trading companies owned
by Vietnamese entered into the rice market. However it was believed that the rice
market in South Vietnam was virtually in the hands of 6-8 Overeas Chinese in Cholon
(Chinese section in Saigon). Overseas Chinese in Saigon could be devided into
several groups. Their family ties were very strong, and they had large amounts of
capital, and tended to deal with one another, and relied on private financing. 34)
The larger rice trading companies which were owned by Vietnamese and entered
the rice market recently as mentioned just above were VIMECO, Kim Nga, Tuy
Viet Me Coc, and Viet Nam Aid Me Coc in July 1974. It seemed that these com-
panies were indirectly supported by the government. Take VIMECO for example,
it had been established in September 1973 by a man3S) who was the Director General
of Taxation in July 1974. The rice mills in the Delta could be grouped into many
small ones and fewer medium and large ones. The larger ones were mostly owned
by the Overseas Chinese, while a considerable part of the small rice mills were owned
by Vietnamese. The Vietnamese owned rice trading company, VIMECO was estab-
lished in order to counteract the dominance of Overseas Chinese in the rice market
by grouping the Vietnamese owned small rice mills in the Delta and doing business
with this group based on the nationalistic cooperatives idea. Upon establishing
VIMECO, a Vietnamese who had a long experiences in rice mill business was hired
as its manager. VIMECO dealt about 12,000 ton of rice and 20,000 ton of paddy
from October to December, 1973. It planned to handle about 50,000 ton in 1974.
It had branch offices in the six provinces in the Delta and each office was equiped with
a rice mill of 1 ton/hour capacity. It also owned a rice warehouse of 20,000 ton size
in Saigon and many warehouses of 100-200 ton capacity in the Delta.
Establishing the Vietnamese owned rice trading companies under the govern-
ment support to counteract the dominance of Overseas Chinese in the rice market
is one development of nationalism in South Vietnam. Overseas Chinese are probably
very efficient merchants in South Vietnam as they are so in Thailand. It will be
important to observe how this nationalistic movement in the rice market of South
Vietnam will develop in the future.
With respect to NFA we will discuss about it in this section as ar fas it is related
with rice marketing. We will discuss the function of NFA in the national rice policy
in the next chapter. NFA was under the supervision of Ministry of Trade and Industry,
34) Based on the author's interviews with rice traders and government officials in charge of rice market
policy, and]ones and Niernberger, op. cit., p. 23.
35) Information about VIMECO was obtained from this man, Mr. Nguen Huyhan, and from other
people in VIMECO.
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Fig.2 Marketing Network for Rice in Vietnam, Nov.........Oct., 1970........71
and it was in charge of purchasing, storage, and distribution of imported nee and
domestic rice and of the control of rice price and marketing. On the first of August
1974 NFA had rice stock of 300,000 tons in total, and about 50% of the stock was the
imported PL480 rice. Around 1974 the total amount of paddy marketed in South
Vietnam in one year was estimated as about 1.5 million tons. Out of this amount
NFA handled 500,.......,600 thousand tons in terms of rice. On the distribution side, NFA
supplied rice (I) to the soldiers and the government employees at the subsidized price,
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(2) to the government approved rice retailers in Saigon to be sold at low price, and
(3) to the rice wholesalers in Central Region where rice supply was dificient. The
marketing structure of rice and paddy in South Vietnam in 1974 including the role
of NFA36) is depicted simply by Figure 1. Jones and Niernberger also described the
structure for the period from November 1970 to October 1971 by Figure 2 with mar-
keted quantities and shares.37)
As described above NFA had a very high share of about 50% in the total amount
of paddy marketed in South Vietnam around 1974. This high share of NFA could
be kept probably by the Rice Marketing Administrative Decree. Under the Decree
all rice traders who transported a certain quantity of rice for commercial purposes
from the Delta to Saigon had to sell the same amount of rice to NFA. The author
considers that this high market share of NFA must have been high enough to exert a
good control over the rice market of South Vietnam.3S)
Next we investigate the regional rice marketing and regional rice balance in South
Vietnam. Table 3 shows a regional rice balance taking into account interregional
rice transfer and regional rice stock for 1972. The numbers in the table are estimated
by the author based on mainly the government statistics.
In computing rice balance in South Vietnam in the past, various estimates for
milling yield, for the amounts used for seeds and feed, and for the amount wasted were
made and used. The author considers some of these estimates are biased based on
his experience in computing the rice balance in Thailand and his field survey in South
Vietnam.39) The author's estimates used for computing Table 3 are presented in
Table 4.
Table 3 tells us that in 1972 about 500 thousand tons of rice was transferred from the
Delta to Saigon (X5), and about 100 thousand tons of rice was imported into Saigon.
Out of these rice shipments into Saigon about 300 thousand tons of rice was used in
Saigon and Eastern Part, and about 200 thousand tons of rice was shipped out of this
area to Central Region. In 1972 about 140 thousand tons of rice was also imported
directly from the U.S.A. to Central Region. There was no direct transfer of rice from
the Delta to Central Region In 1972. These interregional and international flows
of rice in 1972 are depicted In Figure 3.
Regional per capita rice consumption in 1972 can also be calculated as indicated
36) The marketing role of NFA described just above is mainly based on the author's interview with
Dr. Tran Prang Minh, Administrator General of NFA.
37) Jones and Niernberger, op. cit., p. 12.
38) Dr. T. P. Minh, Administrator General of NFA confirmed this point in the author's interview
with him.
39) The past estimates for milling yield were smaller than what it should be. The estimate for loss
or waste in the above-mentioned study of Wildman Agr. Res., Inc. (10% of the total paddy pro-
duction) was too high. The estimate for seeds in the above-mentioned Daly and et ai. study (2%
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in Table 3. As discussed in Section 2.2 above, the regional variation and the national
average of the calculated rice consumption are too large in comparison with the Thai
case. A USDA study calculated regional per capita rice comsumption in 1970 using
the similar method to the author's one, and it also obtained the similar results to the
author's results. Then it judged that the calculated per capita rice consumption in
the Delta was too large. The study considered that this calculated too large rice con-
sumption was caused by feeding a large amount of paddy to pigs in the Delta. It
estimated the part of paddy fed ranged from 12% to 17% of the total paddy produc-
tion during the late sixties and the early seventies!O) But as recognized in the
studi1) many Vietnamese questioned whether that much of paddy was fed to
animals in the Delta. The author of this paper feels the same way based on his
field survey, and he estimates that about 10% of the total paddy production was
used as feed in South Vietnam as indicated in Table 4 above.
In the USDA studies' estimates of the regional rice consumption, rice fed to animals
was included as discussed in the preceding paragraph. But in the author's estimates
of rice consumption, rice used as feed was not included as was clear from the footnote
b of Table 3 and the milling yield for food shown in Table 4. Then what were the
causes for too large regional variation and too large national average of the author's
rice consumption estimates? The author thinks that the causes were inacuracy of
the domestic transport data of rice and error in population estimate.
It was believed that the rice shipment data out of the Delta were underestimated by
10......... 25%. The reasons for this underestimation were (1) failure to count some of the
rice shipments out of the Delta at check points, (2) ignoring rice shipments of less than
500 kg of rice per shipment, and (3) underestimate of weights on movement permit.42)
It was also quite probable that a considerable amount of rice was controlled by NLF
in the Delta and that NLF itself sent fair amount of rice from the Delta to Central
Region. A high official of NFA confirmed this point to the author. The amount
of rice under NLF control is hard to estimate. A minimal estimate is the rice con-
sumption by the soldiers of NLF. If we assume the number of the NLF soldiers to
be a generally believed level of a half million, then this estimate will be around 100
thousand tons of white rice. Regarding population estimates many people believed
that they were underestimated.
As discussed in Section 2. 1 above, the data on paddy production could probably
be underestimated because of the underreport of the area planted to paddy by the
farmers. This underestimation had reverse effect on the calculated rice consump-
tion in comparison with the errors in the domestic shipments and in the population
estimates.
40) Daly, et at., Agriculture in the Vietnam Econotrry, pp. 155-56 and p.201.
41) ibid., p. 155.
42) Jones and Niernberger, op. cit., p. II.
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If all the necessary adjustments for the errors discussed just above could be done,
more accurate rice balance and rice consumption could be estimated. After these
adjustments, per capita rice consumption will probably be lower in the Delta, higher
in the other regions, and lower for the whole South Vietnam in comparison with the
author's original estimates presented in Table 3 above. 43)
Next we investigate each stage of rice market in South Vietnam in detail. The
structure of the rice market was depicted simply by Figure 1 and Figure 2 above.
At the stage of rice market between farmers and local middlemen ("roving mer-
chants") or local rice mills, the progress of land reform in the early seventies caused
considerable changes. This land reform increased the number of small scale owner
farmers greatly, and they started to grow more rice varieties than the tenants had
done under the directions from landlords before this land reform. Multiple cropping
of rice also became popular facilitated by the wide introduction of HYV. Farmers
became less dependent financially on the middlemen, and the bargaining power of
the farmers in the sale of their paddy increased.44 ) These changes must have increased
economic gain of the rice farmers.
In 1972 machine driers were rarely used for rice in South Vietnam. In the early
70's HYV of rice spread very rapidly with multiple cropping of rice, and the amount
of rice harvested in rainy season (mainly HYV paddy) increased considerably.45) Con-
sequently rice drying became a big problem in 1974. One of the so-called "the second
generation problems" of the green revolution was occurring. With respect to the
exact amount of paddy harvested in rainy season, there were contradictory reports.
USAID reported that about 2 million tons of HYV paddy was harvested in rainy season
in 1971/72 crop year, while the Ministry of Land Reform and Agricultun and Fishery
Development (MLRAFD) of the South Vietnam government reported very small
acreage of HYV paddy field was harvested in rainy season in the same year. 46) Any-
way a considerable amount of HYV paddy was harvested in rainy season in South
Vietnam in 1974.47)
With respect to the capacity of grain storage in South Vietnam, Jones and Niern-
43) This expectation is based on (1) Annual per capita rice consumption in Thailand which was a rice
exporting country was about 170 kg in 1963, (2) the NIS's consumption estimate from a survey
of seven cities in South Vietnam was 156 kg per capita, (3) the underestimation of the total paddy
production was probably weakened in 1972 as described in Section 2.1 above.
44) Jones and Niernberger, op. cit., p. 13.
45) When the author made a field survey in the Delta in July 1974 in the midst of rainy season, a lot
of paddy was being harvested or was going to be harvested soon. Considerable part of this paddy
was HYV.
46) Jones and Niernberger, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
47) In the field survey, many rice mill owners and rice traders told the author that wet paddy was a
serious problem and it had low milling quality and sometimes rotted or germinated in marketing
process, and that wet paddy was often mixed with dry paddy to decrease the overall moisture con-
tent in the mixed paddy. They also told the author that wet paddy was priced lower than dry
paddy.
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berger estimated it to be about one million tons in 1972:8) The increase of multiple
cropping of rice mentioned above may decrease the necessary storage capacity of rice.
The total amount of paddy marketed in the early 70's was about 1.5 million tons as
stated above, and paddy was the overwhelmingly important crop among other crops
III South Vietnam. Consequently one million tons of the estimated storage capacity
in South Vietnam must have been big enough to handle the marketed paddy with
some reservation about location of storage houses. But it was reported that the con-
ditions of these storage houses were not good, and that considerable repairs and insect
and rodent control were necessary. The costs for the repairs and insect and rodent
control were reported to be more than offset by the benefits which could be obtained
from these actions.49)
The first impression about the rice mills the author got when he traveled in the
Delta was that they did not have any chimneies. In Thailand most rice mills have
tall chimneies. Although this point might seem to the readers trivial, it did imply an
important fact. The fact is that the rice mills in South Vietnam in 1974 were much
newer than the rice mills in Thailand. In Thailand about 600 rather large rice mills
were built before 1929, and large mills became a little more than 900 in 1951, and
many of them are still operating now. Many of these rice mills still use steam engines
as a source of power for milling which use paddy husks as fuel, and consequently they
need tall chimneies. In South Vietnam, on the contrary, many rice mills used diesel
engines and relatively recent milling machines which did not require tall chimneies.
A FAO's survey of rice mills in South Vietnam in 1964 showed that the rice mills were
relatively newer than those in Thailand. This survey was done by the Consultative
Sub-Committee on the Economic Aspects of Rice, and pointed out that there were
about 2,018 rice mills in South Vietnam in 1963, and out of this total about 97% were
built after 1948 and about 32% after 1958.
The FAO's survey mentioned just above pointed out that about 17% of the total
rice mills were located in cities and near market places. According to the author's
observation in the Delta large and medium size rice mills were located along road
or canal near big cities, and many small rice mills were in small villages. Many of
these small rice mills used Japanese milling machines, and they milled paddy mainly
for farmers' home consumption. The large and medium sized mills milled paddy
mainly for commercial purposes, and some of them were owned by the Overseas
Chinese in Saigon, and other were operating independently and selling rice to Saigon.
Rice traders in Saigon often owned 5......., 1°large rice mills in the Delta, and each trader
specialized in a few specific provinces there. The medium and large rice mills often
milled paddy not owned by the mills on the basis of fee payment.
Regarding the number and milling capacity of rice mills in South Vietnam, there
48) Jones and Niernberger, op. cit., p. 18.
49) ibid., p. 19 and Wildman Agr. Res., Inc., pp. 161-62.
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were DAE data.sO) According to the data there were 2,646 rice mills in the country
and about 650/0 of the total were in the Delta at the end of 1971. These rice mills
milled 1,630 thousand tons of paddy using about 2.8 million hours, and this amount
was about 44% of the total paddy production in 1970/71. The number of rice mills
reported by DAE is too small in comparison with it in Thailand if we compare the
amount of paddy production per one rice mill.s1) This probably implies that in the
DAE data a considerable part of those small rice mills in villages mentioned above
were not counted. The amount milled by the rice mills reported by DAE is also too
small because the DAE data implies that each rice mill operated only about 7.1 hours
per day if we assume that these rice mills operated 150 days per year. But the author's
survey and other dataS2) indicate that rice mills operated on the average much longer
than just 7. 1 hours per day. Because tax on rice mills was calculated based on the
amount milled53), the rice mills probably underreported the amount milled as well
as the total hours of their operation. Consequently, if we take into account the omis-
sion of many small rice mills in the DAE data and the underreport of the amount of
paddy milled and of the total milling hours by the rice mills in the DAE data, we can
say that the total milling capacity of rice mills in South Vietnam was probably not
deficients.) in milling the total paddy production in the country.
During last 15 years the location of rice milling in South Vietnam changed con-
siderably. Up to 1964 considerable amount of paddy was milled in Saigon area.
But after 1964 this amount decreased rapidly, and became nominal amount in and
after 1967.55) This change probably occurred because (1) the transport cost of rice
is much cheaper than that of paddy, (2) the medium of transport of agricultural pro-
ducts from the Delta to Saigon changed mostly from ships to trucks transport cost of
which is much more expensive, and (3) the need on the side of rice mills for easier
access to paddy in local markets. The dispersion of rice milling operation similar
to the one described just above also occurred in Thailand with Bangkok as the disper-
sion center. But the Thai dispersion almost completed by 1950.
The general quality of milled rice in South Vietnam was very poor in comparison
with that in Thailand in 1974. This poor quality was not due to the quality of milling
machines or the skill of mill operators. As described above rice mills in South
Vietnam were much newer than the mills in Thailand. And the author cannot find
50) Directorate of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Statistics Yearbook, 1972, p. 35.
51) This amount was 1,500 tons for Thailand in 1960 and 2,400 tons for South Vietnam in 1971.
52) Jones and Niernberger, op. cit., p. 21; Wildman Agr. Res., Inc., op. cit., p. 156.
53) Wildman Agr. Res., Inc. op. cit., p. 161.
54) In the field survey the author did not corne across any problems related with deficiency in rice mil-
ling capacity.
55) From 1958 to 1964 the weight of paddy sent to Saigon was roughly a half of the weight of rice sent
to the city each year. But after 1964 the amount of paddy sent to Saigon decreased rapidly, and
in and after 1967 the amount became negligible. See p. 133 of Agricultural Statistics Yearbook, 1972
by DAE.
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any evidence to support that Vietnamese mill operators are on the average less skilled
than Thai operators. The author thinks that the poor quality of milled rice in South
Vietnam was due to the following reasons: (I) South Vietnam was once a leading
rice exporting area in the world as Thailand and Burma. She had stopped to export
rice since 1965, and thus there had been no pressure or influence to maintain quality
of milled rice from the side of exporters to the domestic rice market; (2) Since South
Vietnam faced shortage of rice in the state of war, people were more concerned with
quantity rather than quality of rice; (3) the HYV of rice was widely adopted and
grown mainly for sale by the farmers, and as described above a large quantity of wet
HYV paddy harvested in rainy season went into the market which gave poor quality
milled rice after milling. Therefore the problem of poor quality milled rice could
be solved if South Vietnam would again become a rice surplus and rice exporting
area in the near future and proper paddy dryers would be used.
III Marketing Policy and Market Policy Concerning Rice
In the previous chapter supply of, demand for, and marketing and market of
rIce were analyzed in their various aspects. In this chapter we will discuss about
the government policies with respect to rice marketing and rice market around 1974.
As touched a little in Section 2.5 above, these policies were executed through NFA.
NFA was established in 1967, and handled many food items until 1972. But
from 1973 NFA concentrated on rice. In 1974 NFA had one regional office in each
of 4 Military Regions,56) and NFA conducted the following activities: (I) procure-
ment and storage of rice and paddy, (2) handling imported rice, (3) domestic distribu-
tion of rice, (4) supply of subsidized rice to the government employees and soldiers,
and (5) control of demand and supply of rice in Saigon. According to the head of
NFA, Administrator General Dr. T. P. Minh, the objectives of the activities of NFA
were as follows :51)
(1) To assure a minimum price of rice to the farmers and to help farmers to
increase rice production,
(2) To maintain security stock of rice and to stabilize the rIce market,
(3) To prevent rice from going to the NLF side.
In order to achieve the first objective NFA in cooperation with MLRAFD sup-
plied production credit to farmers, and bought rice and paddy at the minimum price
as much as farmers wanted to sell to NFA. The author can point out two problems
56) Military Regions of South Vietnam consisted of 4 regions located and numbered from north to
south as Region I up to Region IV. Military Region IV plus Long An Province was equal to Wes-
tern Part (the Delta) of Southern Region.
57) The functions and objectives of NFA described in this chapter are based on the author's interviews
with Dr. T. P. Minh and with officers in the NFA's Regional Office of Military Region IV at Can
Tho.
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related with the procurement of rice and paddy by NFA. The first problem was the
low ratio of paddy in the total NFA procurement of paddy and rice. (The ratio was
about 10%.) What farmers sell is paddy. Thus if NFA wanted to assure a minimum
price directly to the farmers, it would better buy much more paddy from the farmers.
According to the NFA officials NFA could not buy much paddy because a) NFA did
not have any drying machines, and b) NFA did not have enough human and physical
resources to purchase paddy from the individual farmers in very small quantities in
1973 and 1974. But NFA intended to increase its purchase of paddy in the future
with a help offoreign aids.
The second problem was the tendency that the quality of rice and paddy pur-
chased by NFA was poorer5S) than it by merchants. This tendency was caused by (a)
relatively low procurement price of NFA b) low competitive power of NFA in the
procurement of rice and paddy in comparison with rice merchants.
These two problems in the NFA's procurement was originated from the very
short experience of NFA in the rice market.59) Since NFA was a young institution,
it had to depend on rice merchants or it could not compete on the equal basis with
them.
In order to achieve the second objective, NFA kept security stock of rice and paddy
based on (1) NFA's direct purchase of rice from farmers, cooperatives and rice mer-
chants, (2) NFA's supply of credit to rice merchants and banks for their procurement
of rice for NFA, and (3) NFA's control of the PL480 imported rice, and NFA used
this stock for the stabilization of the domestic rice market. The NFA's security stock
amounted to about 300 thousand tons on August 1, 1974, and the top officials of NFA
considered this amount to be appropriate. This amount is sufficient for two million
Saigon population to live on for one year if we assume annual per capita rice consump-
tion to be at a reasonable level of 150 kg. Around 1974 the amount of rice and paddy
which NFA handled in a year was 500-600 thousand tons. FNA considered this
amount to be sufficient in order to fulfill its objectives. A large part of this amount
consisted of imported PL480 rice, and thus we can say that the PL480 rice contributed
greatly for NFA to keep large shares in the domestic rice market. The basic policy
of NFA with respect to rice marketing was to function as one channel in the rice market
competing with other private channels and not to control the rice market completely.50)
In order to maintain efficiency in rice marketing this basic policy was very appropriate.
58) According to the interviewed rice merchants TN5 and TN8 among the HYVs and low quality
TV's belonged to this category. TN20 and TN22 and medium to high quality TV's tended to
flow to the free market.
59) The NFA's Regional Office at Can Tho was established in June 1974. The author observed that
this office as well as the Regional Office at Tan An in the Military Regional III were recently built
and considerably small in size. and that officers there were very young without much experiences
in rice market.
60) Dr. T. P. Minh's statement.
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For the rice price stabilization, NFA conducted price policies at retail level as
well as at wholesale level. At retail level the two policy measures depicted in Figure I
above were used. They were supply of rice to government employees and soldiers
at subsidized price and release of rice through about 700 government approved retailers
in Saigon at a price lower than market price in the period of rice shortage. NFA
considered the second measure as an effective policy in Saigon during off-season. At
wholesale level the price policy was executed through the regional offices of NFA.
The regional office, and a local committee in each province composed of government
officials, provincial representatives, farmers' representatives, and rice traders jointly
determined the local wholesale prices. These prices were determined for each grade
of paddy and rice. For paddy the price was determined at farm level as well as at
rice mill level. The local wholesale prices were determined by fixing maximum and
minimum levels for each grade, and these two levels were adjusted as market condi-
tions changed. The NFA's regional office bought rice and paddy at a price61) be-
tween these two levels from farmers, rice mills, and rice merchants. The NFA's pro-
curement from rice mills and rice merchants was facilitated considerably by the Rice
Marketing Administrative Decree described in Section 2.5 above. There was a net-
work composed of the NFA's regional office, provincial governer, police, and com-
ptroller located at the road connecting each province and Saigon in order to enforce
this Decree.
The inter-regional adjustment of demand for and supply of rice was another im-
portant aspect of market stabilization objective of NFA. Central region was especially
watched by the government regarding this adjustment.
The third objective of NFA was pursued by the help of the police, the military,
and the provincial governments. South Vietnam was divided into three zones, i. e.,
Free Zone, Contested Zone, and Forbidden Zone regarding the restriction on the
movement of strategic goods like rice, fuel, medicine, etc. Rice transport and rice
milling were put under government licensing, and the government tried to control
rice marketing, and tried to impede NLF's rice marketing.
In conclusion the author thinks that the NFA's basic policy orientation of being
one of many channels in the rice market was proper since it would maintain efficiency
of the rice market in South Vietnam. But since NFA was a young and not very much
experienced institution, it was not able to be very successful in the price support for
paddy, and poor quality rice and paddy tended to be purchased by NFA. In keeping
the security stock and stabilizing the rice market, however, NFA seemed to act fairly
successfully because of the NFA's control of large amounts of imported PL480 rice
and of the Rice Marketing Administrative Decree.
61) This price for farmers was different from the minimum price of paddy assured to farmers mentioned
in the first objective of NFA according to an officer of NFA's Regional Office at Can Tho.
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Conclusion
The rice economy of South Vietnam after the Second World War was affected
greatly by the continuous warfare. The total paddy production stagnated, the total
population increased steadily, and the total rice export declined sharply from its high
level before the War. From 1965 war intensified and the balance between rice supply
and demand deteriorated further, and South Vietnam had to start importing large
amount of rice every year. Simultaneously the rice shipment from the Delta to Saigon
decreased by about 50%.
From around 1968 the war decreased its intensity, and the area planted to rice
and the total paddy production began to increase considerably from around 1969.
Starting with TN8 and TN5, the HYV of rice spread rapidly in the Delta facilitated by
the government policy on fertilizer price. The HYV of rice produced high yield
because of large fertilizer input in South Vietnam. The overall paddy yield per hec-
tare also increased considerably in this period. This increasing trend in the paddy
production and yield was probably accelerated by the fast development of land reform
based on the Land-to-the-Tiller Program started in 1970.
The government policies for rice market and rice marketing were done by NFA in
1974. The author thinks that the NFA's basic policy orientation of being one of many
channels in the rice market was very proper. NFA had a very short experience in rice
marketing, and faced shortage of facilities like driers. Thus poorer quality rice tended
to be procured by NFA than by merchants, and mostly rice and only a small quantity
of paddy were purchased by NFA. NFA began to simplify its comodity lines and to
emphasize rice from 1973, and maintained the security stock of rice bringing together
large amount of the imported rice under PL480 from the U.S. and the procured
domestic rice under the Rice Marketing Administrative Decree. The NFA's market
stabilization policies depending on this security stock seemed to be fairly successful.
With respect to rice marketing, the degree of economic idependence of farmers
from the landlords and rice merchants increased as HYV of rice spread rapidly and
land reform progressed widely in early 70's. Thus the bargaining power of the farmers
against the landlords and merchants increased, and consequently the farmers' paddy
production and their economic gain from the paddy sales also increased. On the
other hand the fast spread of the HYV paddy increased the amount of HYV paddy
harvested in rainy season considerably. Thus the difficulty of drying the HYV paddy
in rainy season became a very serious problem. Mechanical drying machines were
rarely used in South Vietnam. Wet paddy is very easy to deteriorate in its quality,
by rotting or germinating during its marketing.
Rice mills in South Vietnam in the early seventies were on the average newer
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than rice mills in Thailand. The milling capacity was sufficient for the total paddy
production in South Vietnam. The storage capacity for rice and paddy was also
enough for the total amount of paddy and rice marketed in the country. But many
storage facilities were old and needed considerable repair and adequate measures
against insects and rodents.
The quality of milled rice in South Vietnam around 1974 was considerably inferior
to that in Thailand. This is because (1) the large amount of wet HYV paddy harvested
in rainly season went into the rice market, (2) cessation of rice export since 1965 decreased
pressure or requirement to maintain quality of milled rice from rice exporters to the
domestic market, and (3) the persistent rice shortage situation made people consider
quantity first than quality of milled rice.
The investigation of rice statistics of South Vietnam in and before 1974 in this
paper resulted in the following conclusions. Regarding the paddy production statis-
tics, the area planted to paddy was probably underestimated by 10-20% during the
60's. But the degree of this underestimation was decreased considerably in the 70's.
The total paddy production was consequently underestimated by 10-20% during
the 60's, then by less degree in the 70's. This conclusion implies that the fast increase
of paddy production after 1969 described above based on the governmental statistics
must be viewed with some discount. The total paddy production statistics did not
include in them the paddy production in the solid NLF control area. The foreign
trade statistics of rice were most dependable in comparison with other rice statistics.
The domestic shipment data of paddy and rice existed, but they were considerably
underestimated by the technical and political reasons described in the text. The
total rice consumption data did not exist. Thus the regional total and per capita rice
consumption was estimated using the production, domestic shipment, stock, and popu-
lation data. The estimated per capita rice consumption for the whole country as well
as difference between the estimated regional per capita rice consumption were too large.
This was probably caused by the underestimation in the domestic rice shipment data
and in the population data. With regard to the rice price statistics, DAE started to
collect them at farmers', rice mills', and consumers' levels for the whole country in
the 70's. NIS had collected retail and wholesale prices of rice in Saigon starting from
the 50's. It is desirable that these price data will be accumulated for long period in
the future. According to the DAE's price data, the retail prices of TN20 and TN22
in the Delta in February 1974 were 5-13% lower than the prices of TV rice of similer
grade. People still preferred the TV rice to the HYV rice.
Finally the auhor would like to make some comments on the future government
policies concerning rice. It is clear that the government policies for agricultural deve-
lopment should put an emphasis on rice because of the importance of rice in the Viet-
nam economy and the very high compatibility of rice with the climatic and environ-
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mental conditions in the Delta and with the Vietnamese taste as mentioned in the
beginning of Chapter 2 above. During the former regime South Vietnam became
a rice importing country in 1965, and she had to import considerable amounts of rice
every year until the fall of the former regime on April 30, 1975. Consequently the
most important policy goal of the new regime was the attainment of selfsufficiency
in rice. The new regime in South Vietnam was reported to put an emphasis on
agriculture especially an increase in paddy production in its new economic policy
and adopted a policy of transferring a large number of urban families in the Ho Chi
Minh City(former Saigon) to rural area every year to resettle them as individual farms
with assignment of land. During the former regime there were probably about half
a million hectares of paddy field not planted because of the war. When this abandoned
paddy field is all replanted and harvested, the goal of self-sufficiency in rice will pro-
bably be achieved.
The attainment of this self-sufficiency goal depends also on the future of the HYV
of paddy. In 1972/73 crop year about one third of the total paddy area and about
one half of the total paddy production in South Vietnam were the HYV paddy. The
HYV of paddy requires large amount of fertilizer import in order to produce high yield,
and this variety spread very rapidly in South Vietnam facilitated by the fertilizer aid
from the U.S. and the facilitating policies of the former regime. The future of the
HYV paddy depends on (1) the new regime's evaluation of this variety, (2) availability
of fertilizer and other modern inputs, (3) consumers' and farmers' evaluation of the
HYV paddy. The author thinks that since the HYV paddy was already widespread,
and this variety was producing considerably higher yield than the TV paddy in South
Vietnam, and there is a strong need to attain the self-sufficiency goal in rice, it is
desirable for the new regime to support the spread of the HYV paddy. This course
of action is conformable to the published first principle for the construction of the
socialistic economy in Vietnam, i. e., "modernization by technical innovation." The
second problem of availability of fertilizer and other modern inputs mentioned just
above can be at least partially solved by foreign aid. In this aspect Japan can play
an important role. If the new regime abandone the HYV paddy and support only
the TV paddy, it will probably have difficulty in attaining the self-sufficiency goal
In flce. When the new regime support the HYV paddy, then it is very important
for the new regime to further institute a policy to make fertilizer, other agricultural
chemicals, and fuel for pump, etc. available on time to the farmers as well as to teach
the farmers the optimal use of these inputs in order to assure the HYV to produce high
yield.
Is it feasible to set a large amount of rice export in the near future as one important
goal for the agricultural development of Vietnam? The author thinks it is infeasible
because of the following three reasons.
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(1) The conditions for rice production and marketing were deteriorated because
of the long war, and it takes time to restore these conditions upto the level of a
rice exporting country.52)
(2) After the unification of Vietnam in April 25, 1976, economic development of
Vietnam will pursue the principle of comparative advantage, and thus the Delta
will be shipping out rice first to the other part of Vietnam especially to the northern
Vietnam in exchange of industrial products from there.
(3) Even if Vietnam will export rice, price elasticity of the world demand for rice
is considerably small, and thus the more rice Vietnam will export the lower export
price she will get ceteris paribus, and the expected increased earning of foreign
exchange from rice export will probably not obtainable. According to an author's
econometric study the relative price elasticity of the world demand for Thai rice
was estimated to be near unity.63)
Consequently agricultural development policies with a large amount of rice export
as a major goaI6.) should take these three points into due accounts.
Diversification is an essencial element in agricultural development because diver-
sification makes efficient use of domestic resources and increases the power of a country
to deal with the large instability in the world markets of various agricultural products.
It also mitigates the impact of bad rice crop on the Vietnamese economy such as the
temporal climatic damages on rice production in 1977 in Vietnam. Possible products
for diversification in Vietnam are rubber, maiz, sugar cane, fruits, and vegetables,
etc. It is reported that Chochinchina once exported a half million tons of maize per
year.65)
Regarding paddy and rice marketing, if the HYV paddy will be popular in the
future, drying problem of the HYV paddy harvested in rainy season will be a serious
problem as described in the text. It is very desirable that cheap small mechanical
driers will be introduced into the rural area to solve this problem.
With respect to rice and paddy market policies, the new regime had better make
best use of experienced people and their know-how in rice marketing in order to avoid
the problem of lack of experience faced by NFA described in the text.
62) The USDA's econometric study quoted in the text of this paper (Daly, et al., Agriculture in the Viet-
nam Economy, p. 52) projected that South Vietnam would have to import 350 thousand tons of rice
in 1977 under an assumption that the war would cease in 1974.
63) The relative price was formed as a ratio of the average export price index of Thai rice to the FAG's
world rice export price index. Hiroshi Tsujii, An Econometric Study of Effects of National Rice Policies
and the Green Revolution on National Rice Economies and International Rice Trade among Less Developed and
Developed Countries: with Special Reference to Thailand, Indonesia, Japan, and the United States, unpub-
lished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Illinois, March 1973.
64) For example, The Netherland Delta Development Team, Recommendations Concerning Agricultural
Development with Improved Water Control in the Mekong Delta, seven working papers and two appen-
dixes, Bangkok, April 1974 takes this position.
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